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Comment
The Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Group
Membership Interests v. Individual Interests
BACKGROUND
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a union desig-
nated or selected as the collective bargaining agent by a majority
of an employment unit is the unit's exclusive representative,, con-
ducting all negotiations of payrates, wages, hours, or any other con-
ditions of employment on behalf of the employees.2 Thus, the work-
ers forego the right to negotiate individually with their employer
when they choose an agent.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA gives bargaining agents extensive power
over union members. Representatives control the rights of their
members from preliminary contract negotiations to final arbitra-
tion. For example, they have broad discretion over the initial deci-
sion to process a grievance;3 if the bargaining agent decides a griev-
ance is without merit, it can unilaterally dismiss the complaint.
Once a grievance against an employer is filed, the agent can settle
at any stage of the grievance procedure, without the claimant's
consent.' Furthermore, the representative has the authority to plan
strategy throughout the procedure,' as well as broad power to inter-
pret the collective bargaining agreement.' These powers enable
1. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
2. Id. See also Malone v. United States Postal Serv. 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975) (under
the NLRA, employer is required to meet only with exclusive bargaining representative).
3. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1966) (Supreme Court defined unfair representation)
4. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hercules Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (union has
responsibility to sift out frivolous grievances). See also Gunkel v. Garvey, 45 Misc. 2d, 435,
256 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965) (complaint by union member alleging union dropped grievances
short of the highest possible level of adjustment held not to have stated a cause of action).
5. See, e.g., Walden v. Local 71, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1972) (union's decision that a lawyer was not required did not breach the duty).
6. See, e.g., Brock v. Bunton, 383 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 720 (8th
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union leaders to negotiate for all members, without having to bend
to unreasonable demands of an isolated group. This is an important
consideration, since effective negotiations depend on the represent-
ative's freedom to exchange workers' rights for employer conces-
sions.
The duty of fair representation, to which the bargaining agent is
bound, balances the union's extensive discretion with the employ-
ees' interest in having that discretion exercised within identifiable
standards.7 The duty was designed to insure that repre-
sentatives faithfully negotiate for unit members and process all mer-
itorious grievances to the extent of union capabilities and resources.'
If a claimant feels his bargaining agent did not represent him in
good faith throughout the grievance procedure, he can charge the
union with a breach of the duty and seek a judicial remedy for the
breach.9 The mere possibility of a judicial remedy facilitates group
Cir. 1975) (good faith refusal to process a grievance concerning contract interpretation was
upheld).
7. The duty of fair representation is not explicitly set forth in the NLRA. It was created
by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text
accompanying notes 10-16 infra.
8. See 4 La. L. REP. (CCH) 9102, at 15,162. See also Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (union did not breach duty by dropping the grievance because
of lack of funds).
9. Before an employee can bring a court action for unfair labor representation, he is
generally required to exhaust the available grievance procedure. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1966); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1977). Several excep-
tions, however, have been created. For example, if the grievant can prove that exhausting
the procedure would not remedy his claim, he can proceed directly to court. See Peterson v.
Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972). Proof of a union's breach of its duty during
negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement or during any stage of the proceeding
will also exempt the claimant from the general rule. See Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d
258 (9th Cir. 1974); Local 90, American Flint Glassworkers Union v. American Flint Glass-
workers, 374 F. Supp. 600 (D. Md. 1974).
After the grievance procedure has been exhausted, the rendering of a final arbitration
decision does not preclude an employee from bringing suit for breach of the duty. The Su-
preme Court carved a narrow exception to the traditional finality of arbitration by allowing
an attack on the arbitration decision if proof of a breach is offered during the proceeding.
See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
An employee can bring a federal action under section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may
be brought in any district court of the United States." Since section 301 specifically refers to
violations of the contract between the employer and union, the complaint must allege a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 489 (7th Cir. 1970).
If a breach of the collective bargaining agreement is not involved, federal action must be
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), which grants federal courts power to hear all cases
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negotiation; since employees have a remedy for mishandled claims,
they are more likely to acquiesce to union decisions in the early
stages of the procedure. 0
I. ORIGIN OF THE DUTY
A. Early Supreme Court Development
The duty of fair representation was first enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in interpreting the Railway Labor Act (RLA)." In
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad," the Court held that the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineermen could not
alter their collective bargaining agreement to exclude black railroad
workers from preferred jobs. 3 Although blacks were barred from
union membership, the Court found that the RLA prohibited the
bargaining agents from discriminating against the interests of any
employee within the unit, regardless of his nonunion status.'
The Supreme Court analogized the union's duty to the responsi-
bility of a legislator: an obligation to fully represent each of his
constituents. In light of the traditional notion of representation,
the RLA was interpreted to prevent discrimination by the bargain-
arising under congressional acts regulating commerce. See Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878,
883 (5th Cir. 1974).
Although most unfair representation suits are maintained in federal court, state courts also
have jurisdiction. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). If an unfair labor
practice is arguably involved, the doctrine of preemption might cause a state court to defer
to the NLRB. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274, 276 (1971). See also Stout v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Dist. Council,
226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. I1. 1963).
In the first cases presented to the NLRB for resolution, the aggrieved employee requested
that the Board revoke the union's certification. See, e.g., Independent Metal Worker's Union
Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). In 1962 the Board began to rule that a
breach of the duty constituted an unfair labor practice. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181,
51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
10. Most employees are probably not aware of the technical aspects of a judicial remedy,
but they know that they can bring a suit against their union if they are not properly repre-
sented.
11. Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through the representatives of their own choosing, The
majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the
representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act .... 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
12. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
13. Id. at 202.
14. Id. at 202-03.
15. Id. at 202.
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ing agent."6 Although a representative could not avoid making con-
tracts that adversely affect some of the unit's members, the Act was
found to prohibit intentional discrimination on the basis of race."
In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 1s decided the same day as Steele, the
Supreme Court extended the duty to bargaining agents certified
under the NLRA. Thus, all certified labor representatives were and
are responsible for impartial representation of every employee
within their craft.
Although Steele and Wallace created the duty, they did not de-
cide if it applied to voluntarily recognized representatives. Chief
Justice Stone, in his Steele opinion, referred only to statutorily
certified representatives; 9 the opinion, by negative implication,
indicated that a noncertified or voluntarily recognized representa-
tive had no duty.20
The Supreme Court's per curiam reversal of a Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union Local 23,21 filled
the gap left by Steele and Wallace. The dissenting members of the
court of appeals noted the illogic of protecting nonunion workers in
a shop with a statutorily certified union as in Steele, yet allow
discrimination against minority members of a voluntarily recog-
nized union.Y Citation of Steele'in the Supreme Court's reversal of
Syres led commentators to believe the Supreme Court had adopted
that dissent.2 Thus, under the common interpretation of Syres,
every union subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRA is bound to the
duty, regardless of certification status.2 '
Having created the duty and established the scope of its applica-
tion, the Supreme Court explained the representative's obligation
16. Id. at 203.
17. Id.
18. 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944) (a labor organization selected under the NLRA becomes the
agent of all employees and is charged with the responsibility of representing their interests
impartially).
19. 323 U.S. at 204. The Court said that as long as the union acts as the statutory
representative, it cannot refuse to perform the duty.
20. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vn.L. L. REv. 151, 153 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Cox].
21. 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam), rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) (Supreme Court
refused to allow union to create separate and inferior seniority system for blacks).
22. 223 F.2d 739, 746 (5th Cir. 1955) (Rives, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20, at 155. See generally Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representa-
tion: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed
to the Employee, 8 Surl'oLK L. REv. 1096 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Representation].
24. See Cox, supra note 20, at 155.
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in later opinions. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman," the Court moved
in the direction of granting the broad discretion now enjoyed by
unions. Complete satisfaction of all unit members was not re-
quired; 6 bargaining representatives, said the Court, should be al-
lowed a wide range of discretion, subject only to the requirements
of "reasonableness, good faith, and honesty."" The lower courts and
the NLRB were left to give meaning to this imprecise standard.
B. Development in the NLRB
In Hughes Tool Co.,28 one of the first cases calling upon the NLRB
to examine the duty, minority employees requested revocation of
a union's certification because of the union's alleged discriminatory
actions against the workers. Following the rule of Steele and
Wallace, the Board found a breach, and ordered the revocation
unless the union immediately stopped' its discrimination. The
NLRB stated that the union has a " 'responsibility to act as a
genuine representative of all employees in a bargaining unit.' ",29
Nine years later in Miranda Fuel Co., Inc.,30 the NLRB held that
breach of the duty constituted an unfair labor practice.31 The Board
initially discussed the bargaining agent's obligation to represent
each employee equally, without discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or creed. Reading this obligation in the context of the workers'
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing under section 7 of the NLRA,32 the Board found that sec-
25. 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (collective bargaining agreement which gave credit for military
service was declared valid, although it worked to disadvantage of some employees).
26. Id. at 338.
27. Id.
28. 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953) (union policy requiring fees by nonmem-
bers for handling grievances in arbitration found to be sufficient ground for revocation of
certification).
29. Id. at 325, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1011.
30. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962). Miranda involved an employee with high
seniority status who did not return to work on time after a leave of absence. Although the
failure to return was caused by illness, the bargaining representatives insisted the employee's
name be moved to the bottom of the seniority list. When the illness was confirmed by a
doctor, the union changed the basis for its demand to the petitioner's departure before the
date provided in the collective bargaining agreement for leaves.
31. Id. at 190, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1589.
32. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157'(1970), provides in pertinent part: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. .. "
1977-78
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 16: 779
tion 7 guarantees a right to be free from unfair, irrelevant, or invidi-
ous treatment in matters affecting employment." Since section
8(b)(1)(a) of the Act makes a union's interference with employees'
section 7 rights an unfair labor practice," any unfair, irrelevant, or
invidious treatment of employees by the union was held to be an
unfair labor practice. 5 The Board's decision indicated that the
union's activities also violated section 8(b)(2),3 1 making an attempt
to cause an employer to derogate employment status for arbitrary
or irrelevant reasons an unfair labor practice. 7 In addition, the
NLRB found the employer in Miranda was partly responsible for the
interference with section 7 rights and thus found him guilty of an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1). s
On appeal, the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
decision in Miranda.3 9 The circuit court decided that the alleged
discrimination was not related to union membership, loyalty, or
authority, or performance of union obligations.40 Since the treat-
ment accorded the workers did not involve unfair or irrelevant union
conduct, it did not violate the worker's section 7 rights.' According
to the Second Circuit, the union representative did not commit an,
33. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
34. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), provides: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 157 ...."
35. Id. See generally Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L.J.
1327 (1958).
36. Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents. . .(2) to cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) .... "
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization .... "
37. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. See Local 357, International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (interpreting § 8(b)(2)).
38. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1970), provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right guaranteed in section 157
[section 7] of this title .... " See also Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1953) (interpreting § 8(a)(3)).
The Board countered the finding of a § 8(b)(2) violation against the union with a finding
that the employer's participation violated § 8(a)(3). For the pertinent provisions of § 8(a)(3),
see note 36 supra.
39. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
40. Id. at 175.
41. Id. at 179.
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unfair labor practice merely by causing an employer to promote or
demote employees. To violate the act, the discrimination must be
based on union membership or other union activities, rather than
on conduct unrelated to the union."2
Despite the circuit court's decision in Miranda, the Board contin-
ued to find that a union breach of the duty of fair representation
was an unfair labor practice. For example, in Independent Metal
Workers Union,'3 the Board ruled that a union's refusal to process
a grievance because of the aggrieved worker's race violated sections
8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA." Subsequently, the Fifth
Circuit began to enforce such NLRB rulings. 5
The significance of the NLRB's decision to hold that the union's
breach of its duty is an unfair labor practice becomes apparent when
the doctrine of preemption is considered. As defined in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,"1 preemption gives the NLRB
exclusive jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices. In Garmon,
the Supreme Court stated: "when [a labor] activity is arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the
States as well as federal courts must defer to the exclusive compe-
tence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state
interference is to be averted."47 This statement reflects the reason
for the NLRB's creation. Since the NLRA involves concepts foreign
to most common law theories, Congress wanted labor disputes to be
adjudicated by a body with expertise in labor relations. After
Garmon was decided, a split developed among the circuits over the
Board's exclusive jurisdiction in fair representation suits. In Smith
v. Evening News Association,"8 however, the Supreme Court held
that state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the
NLRB over such suits.
A later Supreme Court case" explained why unfair representation
42. Id. at 180.
43. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964) (Board revoked union certification be-
cause the union discriminated on basis of race in determining eligibility for membership).
44. Id. at 1574, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1290.
45. See, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Board found union's refusal to process grievance was racially motivated).
46. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
47. Id. at 245.
48. 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962). The Court stated that where an activity is a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Board's authority is not exclusive and does not destroy
the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. at 197.
49. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974). See also
1977-78
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actions are not preempted: congressional policy favoring settlement
of labor cases by the Board is not applicable to a suit for breach of
the duty of fair representation brought under section 301.50 Congress
chose to leave the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
to the usual process of the law. By definition, a section 301 suit is
brought as a result of an alleged contract violation. The Board had
consistently refrained from exercising jurisdiction in a controversy
that was arguably a contract violation as well as an unfair labor
practice, if the collective bargaining agreement provided a settle-
ment procedure.5' The NLRB believed that when the parties had
agreed upon procedures for resolving disputes, they should be given
an opportunity to make those procedures work; grievances should
be settled within the company if possible." Thus, the courts, in
exercising jurisdiction over section 301 actions, were not intruding
into the Board's exclusive territory.
C. Definite Supreme Court Standard
In Vaca v. Sipes,3 the Supreme Court clarified the duty it had
created in Steele, Wallace, and Huffman. The petitioner in Vaca
charged his union with arbitrarily refusing to take his allegedly
wrongful discharge to arbitration. In finding the duty had not been
breached, the Court established the burden of proof in unfair repre-
sentation cases. "A breach of the statutory duty of fair representa-
tion occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
297-98 (1971) (reaffirming the exception to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction to unfair labor
practice cases).
50. For the text and explanation of § 301, see note 9 supra.
51. See, e.g., The Assoicated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1972). An employee can bring an
action against his bargaining representative and employer under § 301(a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). For the pertinent provisions of § 301(a),
see note 9 supra.
52. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1971).
53. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Vaca involved the union's privilege of not taking a grievance to
arbitration.
Owens, a high blood pressure patient, became ill and entered a hospital. After a long rest,
his doctor certified that he was ready to return to work. The company doctor disagreed and
refused to certify him. Owens secured the opinion of another doctor and returned to work.
He was discharged on grounds of poor health. The union processed his grievance through three
of five steps and then sought the opinion of yet another doctor. This third doctor agreed with
the company, but Owens demanded the union take his grievance to arbitration. When the
union refused, Owens brought an action alleging breach of the duty of fair representation.
Vol. 16: 779
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith."5"
The Court adopted Professor Cox's union-controlled grievance
theory5" as the ideal employer-representation relationship. Cox felt
the representative should have discretion to dismiss a meritless
complaint at any stage of the grievance procedure, 5 and that em-
ployees have no right to arbitration. Smooth operation of the system
depended on the union's power to weed out frivolous claims, because
if every complaint proceeded to arbitration, the system would be
hopelessly bogged down and ineffective. 57 Thus, the Court con-
cluded, the employer and union should agree to make a good faith
effort to settle grievances short of costly, time-consuming arbitra-
tion.
The Vaca "arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith" standard is
necessary to the union-controlled grievance theory. Once the Court
allowed the union complete discretion to ignore, settle, or fully pro-
secute grievances, the standard for unfair representation had to
shield the bargaining agent from spurious suits and yet be available
to remedy serious union misconduct. The Vaca standard, then, at-
tempts to balance union power with the employees' right to impar-
tial representation.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DUTY
The Vaca standard continues to serve as the basic definition of
unfair representation. It should be noted, however, that a union
member charging a breach does not have to prove that the union's
conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith; each is a
separate union obligation.58 For example, discriminatory union ac-
tivity need not be motivated by bad faith. 9
Although the standard is readily identifiable, the courts have
placed a heavy burden of proof on the employee who alleges a
breach. To prove a breach, the employee must offer substantial
evidence of intentional and severe discrimination that is unrelated
54. Id. at 190.
55. Id. at 191. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAsv. L. Rav. 601 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Labor Agreement].
56. 386 U.S. at 191.
57. Id.
58. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
59. Id. at 309-10.
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to legitimate union objectives. 0 Courts generally agree that negli-
gence alone will not support an employee's action for breach of the
duty.6'
The Supreme Court, possibly realizing that the burden of proof
was practically insurmountable, aided union members by establish-
ing liberal pleading standards: "where the courts are called upon to
fulfill their role as the primary guardians of the duty of fair repre-
sentation," complaints should be construed to avoid dismissal, and
employees at the very least "should be given an opportunity to file
supplemental pleadings, unless it appears 'beyond doubt' that they
cannot state a good cause of action.""
Still, the burden of proof is rarely met." Substantial facts must
be pleaded or alleged for the complaint to withstand a motion for
summary judgment." To defend against a charge of unfair represen-
tation, the union normally only has to show that it intended to
adequately represent an employee. 5
Early in 1976, the smooth operation of the grievance procedure
was apparently endangered by the Supreme Court's decision to set
aside a final arbitration verdict as the result of a showing of unfair
60. 386 U.S. at 194. Even in Vaca, where the Supreme Court defined the duty, the
majority held the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. The Court emphasized that
the union processed the grievance through three steps of the grievance procedure. Ultimately,
the union's discretion permitted it to dismiss the complaint as nonmeritorious. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Ambac Indus., Inc., 369 N.Y.S. 2d 170 (App. Div. 1975) (plaintiff must allege
more than discrimination before he can succeed in a fair representation suit), aff'd, 387
N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1976).
61. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1971). But see Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). In
Ruzicka, the plaintiff was discharged for being intoxicated while on the job. Plaintiff's union
pursued his claim through three steps of the procedure but failed to file a timely application
for arbitration. Consequently, arbitration was denied. The Court, finding for the plaintiff,
said the union had been negligent, but violation of the Vaca standard had not been proved.
62. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27 (1970) (citing O'Mara v. Erie Lackawana R.R., 407
F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1969)).
63. See, e.g., Powell v. Globe Indus., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (conclusory
allegations are insufficient in an action for breach of fair representation; substantial facts are
needed to prove the claim). Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 499 (D. Ore. 1977)
(a breach must be proven by a showing of substantial facts).
64. See Marietta v. Cities Service Oil Co., 414 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.J. 1976) (to withstand
motion for summary judgment, the employee pleaded the union did nothing to prepare
employee's grievances, did not attempt to obtain favorable medical evidence, and did not
pursue favorable recommendations of doctor). See also Washington Post Co. v. Printing and
Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 79 Lab. Cas. 11, 503 (1976) (mere allegations of
bad faith without proof will be subject to summary judgment).
65. See Rehahn v. General Motors Corp., 80 Lab. Cas. 12,009 (1976) (plaintiffs did not
make out a successful case bacause they failed to show union's bad faith).
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representation." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.67 involved
employees who were discharged for submitting allegedly inflated
motel receipts for reimbursement. Their local union filed a griev-
ance based upon the workers' firm denial of the charges. Arbitration
was scheduled, and shortly before it was held, the union assured the
grievants that they had "nothing to worry about.""
At arbitration, the union failed to produce any evidence to sup-
port the employees' claims of innocence." Consequently, the em-
ployees were discharged. They then retained independent counsel
who found that the hotel clerk had falsified the receipts. The
grievants brought a section 301 action alleging that the union
breached its duty by failing to investigate the claim properly.' The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
granted the union's motion for summary judgment; it believed the
arbitration was not subject to review.7 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the decision on the basis of the finality of the arbitration.7 2
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, reversed,
holding that the union had breached its duty. 3 Although the major-
ity opinion asserted allegiance to the Vaca standard, the standard
was apparently applied differently. In Hines, there was no proof
that the union handled the case in bad faith or in a discriminatory
manner. The union's only fault was its failure to interrogate the
motel clerk to the point where he admitted to having falsified the
receipts.
Soon after the Hines decision, commentators wrote that the Court
changed its unfair representation standard from bad faith to bad
performance. 4 It was thought the new standard would encourage
courts to review arbitration decisions more frequently and more
thoroughly.7 5 Hines was also thought to damage Professor Cox's
66. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 560.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hines v. Local 337, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 72 Lab. Cas. 13,987 (N.D. Ohio
1973). The court also believed that the employees did not prove a breach of the Vaca stan-
dard.
72. Hines v. Local 337, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974).
73. 424 U.S. at 572.
74. See Waldman, The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, 29th N.Y.U. CoNy.
LAB. 279 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Waldman].
75. Id. See also Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974) (court held an
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union-controlled grievance theory7" adopted by the Vaca Court;
faced with the threat of court action, unions would press every griev-
ance to the end, rather than weed out the frivolous claims.
Cases decided after Hines show the lower courts have not applied
Hines liberally.77 Although Hines did open the door to section 301
actions, the stiff burden of proof remains. Most of the cases citing
Hines as controlling authority have not found a breach of theduty!'
These cases almost unanimously maintain that the plaintiff must
not only prove a breach, but must also prove that the breach seri-
ously undermined the integrity of the grievance procedure.8 0 In the
context of arbitration, for example, the employee must show that a
breach directly caused the proceeding to miscarry.sl
III. SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE THE DUTY is APPLIED: POSSIBLE EFFECTS
OF HINES
A. Preliminary Contract Negotiations
The collective bargaining agreement, negotiated by the union and
employer, defines employee rights for the life of the contract. While
the bargaining agent negotiates for as many rights as possible, the
employer wants to minimize employee benefits. The representative
is compelled to subordinate the interests of specific workers and
bargain with the interests of the entire union membership in mind.
employee was not required to make an allegation of bad faith, deceit, or dishonesty against
the union in order to state a claim for relief based on unfair representation).
76. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 547
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977) (court interpreted Hines as requiring a showing of bad faith); Harrison
v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977) (where grievance submitted to arbitration in
accordance with proper procedure, a district court can only review if there is a breach of the
duty). But see Carrier Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1976) (court
believed that Hines required the proceedings to be scrutinized even if they superficially
appeared to be regular).
78. Mitchell v. Hercules Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (employee can now
make out a case of unfair representation after arbitration).
79. See, e.g., Siskey v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local
261, 419 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (court found no breach, even in light of Hines); Beavers
v. Strickland Transp. Co., 423 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (court followed Hines and ruled
that the burden of proof was not met).
80. See, e.g., Cofrancesco v. City of Wilmington, 419 F. Supp. 109, 111 (D. Del. 1976)
(breach must seriously undermine the integrity of the arbitration process). See generally
Hardin, The Supreme Court October 1975 Term: Labor in a Constitutional Vineyard, 1977
LAB. L. Dev. 1, 42 [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Vineyard].
81. See Constitutional Vineyard, supra note 80, at 42.
Vol. 16: 779
Thus, the agent needs the flexibility to concede to some of the
employer's demands.
Recognition of the trade-off between individuals' rights and rights
of the unit makes the courts willing to lower the standard of conduct
required of the representative while it is negotiating the agreement.
In negotiations, union bargaining discretion is subject only to the
test of good faith and honesty of purpose."2 The Supreme Court, for
example, granted the representative full authority to make the con-
cessions it believes will best serve the entire unit.1 Necessarily, the
duty does not demand that each unit member be satisfied with
every aspect of the contract.8' Consequently, the union has more
leeway in contract negotiations than in any other area where the
duty is enforced."
Despite this broad leeway, application of the Hines bad perform-
ance standard in contract negotiations could cause union bargaining
agents to demand minority rights that normally would be traded in
the interest of the majority. Given the dent Hines arguably placed
in the :union-controlled grievance theory, minority workers might
contend that their representative discriminated against them by
trading valuable minority rights, to assure the rights of others. Even
if. the effect on union negotiators is minor, Hines may cross the
representative's mind at the bargaining table and the threat of a
bad performance suit may jeopardize majority rights for the sake of
minority.
B. Administration of the Agreement
Union authority to dismiss claims at any stage of the grievance
procedure without employee consent was established in Vaca v.
Sipes.s6 By granting this power, the Supreme Court intended to
encourage bargaining representatives to settle nonmeritorious
82. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See generally Blumroee, Duty
of Fair Representation-Individual Rights under Collective Contracts-What Should the
Rule Be?, 15 LAB. L.J. 598 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Individual Rights].
83. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See also Anderson v. Ambac Indus.,
Inc., 387 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1976), aff'g, 369 N.Y.S.2d 170 (App. Div. 1975) (obtaining different
benefits for each group of unit employees did not, in itself, constitute unfair representation).
84. 345 U.S. at 337.
85. See generally Cox, supra note 20.
86. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Mitchell v. Hercules Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ga.
1976) (union does not breach merely by settling a claim prior to arbitration).
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claims short of arbitration. 7 Accordingly, courts usually defer to the
representative's decision to dismiss a grievances If the decision to
dismiss is based on good faith judgment, without discriminatory or
arbitrary overtones, it will not be disturbed."9
Hines, however, could have the practical effect of limiting the
union's discretion to dismiss claims. If lower courts read the deci-
sions as equating bad faith with bad performance, as some commen-
tators have," unions will be reluctant to dismiss claims prior to
arbitration. The fear of an unfair representation suit will encourage
representatives to press claims to the end of the procedure.9 Thus
far, though, courts have been reluctant to find for grievants in a suit
based on a claim dismissal unless the plaintiff makes out an obvious
case of breach.92
C. Arbitration
The Supreme Court, in the Steelworker's Trilogy, 3 established a
87. 386 U.S. at 182. See also Curth v. Faraday Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
(no breach found where union processed grievance through few steps of procedure and dis-
missed prior to arbitration).
88. See, e.g., Powell v. Globe Industries, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (court
accepted union judgment that the company's offer was the best the employee could get).
89. See, e.g., Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 547
F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1977) (claimant cannot ask court to redetermine merits of arbitration
claim without showing of bad faith); Rehahn v. General Motors Corp., 80 Lab. Cas. 12,009
(1976) (although court criticized union judgment, it did not find unfair representation).
90. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 74 at 287.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Powell v. Globe Indus., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (plaintiff
must make substantial showing of breach); Mangiaguerra v. D & -L Transp., Inc., 410 F.
Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (suit dismissed for lack of evidence of breach).
Choice of tactics in the grievance procedure is also within the union's discretion. Walden
v. Local 294, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (union's decision
to proceed without a lawyer was upheld). A liberal interpretation of Hines, however, could
cause unions to press grievances with every possible argument, to prevent a charge of bad
performance. As yet, poor choice of strategy or tactical deficiency has rarely been held to rise
to the level of a breach, even a bad judgment, made in good faith, has been protected.
Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transp., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (union's failure to
object to hearsay evidence is not a breach of the duty); Bantley v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 82 Lab.
Cas. 10,168 (1977) (no breach where union failed to object to damaging evidence). Unions
do not have to advance every theoretically available argument on demand of members. See,
e.g., Hilliard v. Armco Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658, aff'd, 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976) (failure
to take plaintiff's grievance to arbitration on theory that alcoholism was a disease and should
qualify plaintiff for sick leave was not a breach).
93. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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judicial preference for resolving industrial disputes through arbitra-
tion. The Court declared that an arbitrator's decision binds the
parties and is rarely subject to review. Furthermore, the NLRB has
refused to exercise jurisdiction in cases where an arbitration clause
was included in the collective bargaining agreement." Thus, both
the Supreme Court and the Board decided employee rights should
be determined within the grievance procedure, culminating in final
arbitration.
The Hines decision, however, weakens the finality of arbitration.
In Hines, the Court held a breach of the duty permits the employee
to litigate his grievance despite an adverse decision in arbitration.95
Thus, Hines could have several effects on arbitration.
Union officials usually handle arbitration proceedings on behalf
of employees." Now, a union may open itself to court action for
ineffective representation if it does not provide an attorney in arbi-
tration of major grievances. Fear of liability may compel the bar-
gaining agent to hire an attorney in cases where legal counsel would
not aid the claimant.97
In the past, unions and management have resolved petty disputes
quickly and amicably by agreeing, during the course of arbitration,
to "trade off" minor grievances, thus advancing more common em-
ployee rights.'8 These trade-offs are legal and save time, money, and
needless conflict. Since arbitration can now be collaterally attacked,
unions might be reluctant to trade even meritless claims. Thus,
Hines could cause a decline in union-employee trade-offs.
Finally, Hines may change the employer's approach to arbitra-
tion. Since a grievant in a section 301 action is required to join the
employer with -the union as a defendant," management will have an
interest in preventing unfair representation suits. The employer can
avoid section 301 actions by fully litigating even marginal claims,
but that would undermine the union-controlled grievance theory.
Furthermore, while the employer will want to advocate his position
in the arbitration, he may not want to put forth his best effort, for
fear that it will disclose union incompetence.10
94. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
95. 424 U.S. at 571.
96. See Labor Agreement, supra note 55, at 289.
97. See Waldman, supra note 74, at 291.
98. Id,
99. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
100. See Waldman, supra note 74, at 294.
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A liberal reading of Hines could produce these consequences. The
vast majority of cased decided after Hines, however, have upheld
the finality of arbitration; plaintiff's have not been able to meet the
burden of proof.'10 Lower courts seem to have realized the poten-
tially upsetting effect of Hines on the union-controlled grievance
theory. To preserve union discretion, they have maintained the
heavy burden of proof in arbitration cases. The plaintiff must prove
that the breach directly caused an erroneous outcome in arbitra-
tion.'"
Thus, the effect of the Hines exception on finality has been held
to a minimum. Still, it prevents management's wrongful conduct
from going unremedied because of unlawful union action, since a
form of collateral attack is provided, albeit a heavy burden is placed
on the plaintiff. This is a justifiable condition to the strong pre-
sumption of validity that the courts continue to give to arbitration.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, the Supreme Court in Hines seemed to have
changed the focus of the union-controlled grievance theory, '0 giving
some of the union's power to the employees through a "bad perform-
ance" standard. That standard would have made dismissal of an
unfair representation suit rare. For two years, however, the lower
courts have interpreted Hines narrowly, refusing to give the employ-
ees an advantage. 0 Under their interpretation of Hines, an arbitra-
tion decision can only be upset if the employee first proves a breach
and then proves the breach caused him to lose the arbitration. 05
101. See, e.g., Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 547
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977) (grievant failed to prove that union arbitrated in bad faith); Beavers
v. Strickland Transp. Co., 423 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (employee's claim denied for lack
of proof).
102. See, e.g., Cofrancesco v. City of Wilmington, 419 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1976) (breach
must seriously undermine the integrity of the arbitral process); Powell v. Globe Indus., Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove breach);
Beavers v. Strickland Transp. Co., 423 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (plaintiff failed to prove
breach under Hines).
103. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
104. See, e.g., Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 547
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977) (court interpreted Hines to require a showing of bad faith). See
generally Constitutional Vineyard, supra note 80, at 42.
105. See, e.g., Siskey v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local
261, 419 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (court interpreted Hines). See generally Constitutional
Vineyard, supra note 80, at 42.
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Since claimants are required to plead and prove substantial facts
in support of their claim, the burden of proof has been prohibitive.
Fortunately, Hines has been interpreted narrowly by the lower
courts: effective and efficient operation of the union-management
system requires that decisions as to what grievances to process be
made by the bargaining agent. The agent should consider and weigh
interests rather than act to prevent a possible law suit. The union
representative is in a position to evaluate the workers' needs and
decide what is best for the unit. Subordination of the demands of
isolated groups for the benefit of the majority is a necessary evil.
The minority, however, also benefits from the system; without im-
partial representation they would be completely dominated by the
majority.
When employees elect a bargaining agent, they expect to be repre-
sented honestly and impartially through the best efforts of their
agent. If the representative lives up to those expectations, he should
not be held liable. Only when a serious breach occurs-as judged by
the Vaca "arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith" standard-should
the union be held responsible. Realistically, every employee cannot
have what he wants. Through the union-controlled grievance
theory, the minority is impartially represented, and the entire unit
gains all possible work-related benefits. The system properly bal-
ances union power and employee control over the grievance proce-
dure.
THOMAS J. SANTONE
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